These web pages are the sole responsibility of the Long Bow Group, and are in no way affiliated with or sponsored by Jenzabar, Inc.
Twenty years after the events of 1989, Chai Ling and her company, Jenzabar, are attempting to censor this website.
Read a summary of their lawsuit against the Long Bow Group, and view an online appeal for support.
Below are the case filings from the suit.
Jenzabar, Inc., Ling Chai, and Robert A. Maginn, Jr., v. Long Bow Group, Inc.
Related pages: About Chai Ling and Jenzabar, Inc. | Jenzabar and Long Bow Group Correspondence, Feb.-April 2007
These legal filings are part of the public record. They are presented here in the interests of full disclosure and historical accuracy.
1. Complaint - May 14, 2007 (PDF)
2. Motion to Dismiss - October 2, 2007 (PDF)2a. Defendant Long Bow Group Inc.'s Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss (PDF)3. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Long Bow Group, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss - Feb. 20, 2008 (PDF)
2b. Exhibits A and B to Motion to Dismiss (PDF)
4. Defendant Long Bow Group Inc.'s Reply Memorandum in Further Support of its Motion to Dismiss - March 14, 2008 (PDF)
5. Decision on Motion to Dismiss - August 5, 2008 (PDF)
6. Answer of Defendant Long Bow Group, Inc. - April 23, 2009 (PDF)
7. Jenzabar's Emergency Motion for Protective Order - May 29, 2009 (PDF)
8. Long Bow's Opposition to Jenzabar's Emergency Motion for Protective Order - June 1, 2009 (PDF)
9. Long Bow's Emergency Motion for Relief Pursuant to Rule 37(d) Due to Plaintiff's Failure to Answer Interrogatories and Failure to Appear at Depositions - June 1, 2009 (PDF)
10. Affidavit of Counsel to Defendant Long Bow Group, with exhibits (filed by Long Bow in support of its position on both motions) - June 1, 2009 (PDF)
11. Court's hand-written orders on both motions, transcribed below - June 2, 2009 (PDF)Order on Jenzabar's Emergency Motion for Protective Order12. Defendant Long Bow Group Inc.'s Renewed Emergency Motion for Relief Due to Plaintiffs' Failure to Provide Discovery - July 9, 2009 (PDF)
With the exception of private client lists and financial info, which will be held confidential for use solely in these proceedings and not disclosed elsewhere, this motion is denied. However, it is denied without prejudice. If based on future events, including discovery, internet postings, etc., plaintiffs are able to make the requisite showing, this Court will consider the issue and make the necessary order, including, if appropriate, a "claw-back" provision regarding depos. At this time, however, Court will not construe fear of bad publicity as constituting an adequate showing; nor the concern re: trademarks, etc.
Order on Long Bow's Emergency Motion for Relief Pursuant to Rule 37(d)
Motion allowed as follows: Answer to Ints and other pending written discovery, if any, to plaintiffs shall be filed on or before June 12, 2009. Depositions of plaintiffs shall occur after that but no later than June 23, 2009. This includes 30(b)(6) deposition. Depos of defendants may follow this discovery. Further relief sought in this motion is denied, without prejudice. This Court will entertain all options and sanctions in the event plaintiffs fail to comply with this Order. However, at this time, the Court considers the non-responses to be the result of a good faith dispute.From the Emergency Motion (p. 1): Plaintiffs have exhibited utter contempt for this Court's fundamental discovery rules and this Court's June 2, 2009 Order, resulting in overwhelming substantive prejudice to Long Bow. Beyond plaintiffs' extraordinary disrespect, it is now clear that their lawsuit is nothing more than a vengeful effort to retaliate against Long Bow and an abusive ploy rooted in plaintiffs' disapproval of Long Bow's 1995 documentary film, The Gate of Heavenly Peace.13. Affidavit of Counsel to Defendant Long Bow Group (filed by Long Bow in support of the above Emergency Motion) - July 9, 2009 (PDF)From the Affidavit (p. 6):14. Defendant Long Bow Group's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment - Oct. 13, 2009 (PDF)
Plaintiffs have represented that they have no responsive documents in the following categories:
- Plaintiffs have no documents concerning Long Bow's alleged use of Jenzabar's trademarks;
- Plaintiffs have no documents concerning the allegation that "numerous inquires from and misunderstandings with Jenzabar's clients" resulted from Long Bow's website;
- Plaintiffs have no documents concerning any instances of confusion allegedly caused by Long Bow's use of Jenzabar's trademarks;
- Plaintiffs have no documents concerning any business opportunities allegedly lost as a result of Long Bow's use of Jenzabar's trademarks;
- Plaintiffs have no documents concerning any harm allegedly suffered by them as a result of Long Bow's use of Jenzabar's trademarks;
- Plaintiffs have no documents concerning any efforts by them to stop or prevent persons other than Long Bow from use of Jenzabar's trademarks;
- Plaintiffs have no documents concerning their allegation that Long Bow is motivated by sympathy for officials in the Communist government of China;
- Plaintiffs have no documents concerning their allegation that Long Bow is motivated by malice toward Chai Ling and a desire to discredit Chai Ling and advance Long Bow's divergent political agenda.
In October 2009, Public Citizen, a national non-profit Public Interest Organization, decided to offer legal representation to the Long Bow Group because of the serious First Amendment issues raised by Jenzabar's lawsuit. On October 13, Public Citizen attorney Paul Alan Levy, along with Boston lawyers Christopher Donnelly and Adam Ziegler, served a "Motion for Summary Judgment" asking for the case to be dismissed.15. Defendant Long Bow Group, Inc.'s Concise Statement of Material Facts That Plaintiff Jenzabar, Inc. Cannot Dispute - Oct. 13, 2009 (PDF of Statement | PDF of Exhibits 1-10)
From the Memorandum (pp. 1-2): [T]he lawsuit is frivolous. First, Jenzabar relies only on uninformed speculation to argue that the keyword meta tags caused Long Bow's Jenzabar-related page to appear high on the Google search results; in fact Google itself has stated in no uncertain terms that it does not consider keyword meta tags in determining search rankings, and stopped taking those meta tags into account "many years ago." Thus, the central factual premise of Jenzabar's case is false. Second, even were there a factual basis to assert that meta tags caused this one page to appear among the first ten search results, the meta tags correctly portray the content of that web page as being about Jenzabar. Jenzabar's invocation of government authority (that is, this Court) to suppress the communication of truthful, non-commercial speech about the presence of Jenzabar-related information on that page runs afoul of the First Amendment. Third, construing the trademark laws in light of the First Amendment to avoid needless adjudication of First Amendment questions, neither the doctrine of initial interest confusion nor any of Jenzabar's other theories form a sound basis for allowing Jenzabar's claim to proceed to trial. Fourth, even considering this case in ordinary trademark terms, such as the "likelihood of confusion" factors and the defense of fair use, summary judgment should be granted dismissing this action.
In opposition to Long Bow's motion to dismiss, Jenzabar argued principally that it would be "premature" to reject the trademark claims at the pleading stage. Because Jenzabar's complaint used labels, conclusions, and allegations that the Court felt rule-bound to accept, the Court declined to dismiss the trademark claims but noted the likelihood that Jenzabar's claims would fail. Discovery has since shown that Jenzabar cannot prevail. The allegations that led this Court to decline dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) are false, and Jenzabar no longer can plead for patience.
16. Opinion Granting Summary Judgment - Dec. 7, 2010